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Commentary
Uncertainty and Risk Are Multidimensional:
Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic
David W. Stewart
The COVID-19 pandemic is a generational phenomenon, a
defining experience for those who have experienced it. Much
will be written about the causes and effects of the pandemic as
additional data become available. Although not deliberate,
there are quasi-experiments underway related to alternative
societal responses to the pandemic, such as the reduction of
economic and social activity, the degree of social distancing,
and the focus of social distancing efforts.
It is too early for any comprehensive analysis of the effects
of and response to the pandemic. Nevertheless, there are les-
sons to be learned or, at least, remembered. This commentary
offers a discussion of four of these lessons: (1) the differences
between uncertainty and risk, (2) the multidimensionality of
both uncertainty and risk and responses to them, (3) the multi-
layered character of risk management and public policy
response, and (4) the role of marketing in the management of
risk and uncertainty.
Uncertainty 6¼ Risk
The risk of COVID-19 is still unknown. The response(s) has
been driven by uncertainty. Risk and uncertainty are different,
and it is easier to manage risk (Martin and Stewart 2019). Risk
is quantifiable, with known outcomes and known probabilities
of these outcomes. Uncertainty exists when there are several
potential outcomes, some or all of which may be unknown, and
the probabilities of these outcomes cannot be quantified. In the
context of COVID-19, the likelihood of contracting the virus
remains unknown, though it is increasingly apparent it has been
more common than originally thought. This means that its
mortality rate is unknown. If morbidity and mortality were
known, it would be possible to determine the risk of both con-
tracting and dying from COVID-19. However, even this simple
computation is confounded by data problems.
One reason the mortality rate associated with COVID-19
initially appeared high was because it was only recorded when
people arrived at a hospital or clinic. This is a reason early
models predicted very high death rates. Further complicating
matters, individuals who died with COVID-19 were conflated
with who individuals died of COVID-19. The severity of the
virus and death rates have been highest among individuals who
have other medical conditions and are older. COVID-19 may
have contributed to these deaths, but it may not be the cause.
Risk assessment, with its emphasis on known outcomes and
the probabilities of those outcomes, carries with it a sense of
control. In contrast, uncertainty is often met with dread, social
aversion, and a sense of loss of control. Feelings of dread are a
strong determinant of risk perception (Martin and Stewart
2019). Uncertainty is often dealt with by combining data with
assumptions, and different assumptions can produce wildly
different predictions, as demonstrated by the differences in
early models of the contagion and mortality of COVID-19.
To deal with uncertainty, it is common to use the most conser-
vative of assumptions, which in most cases produces an exag-
gerated risk (Whipple 1986). Such an approach—“better safe
than sorry”—may be useful in cases of uncertain outcomes that
are small and easily isolated, but it is problematic in most
contexts. It offers a false sense of control by focusing on a
single outcome.
Uncertainty and Risk Are Multidimensional
A problem associated with the management of uncertainty and
risk is that actions and policies rarely have a single effect. Even
if the optimal public health actions in response to COVID-19
involved shutting down much of the economy and extreme
social distancing, these actions must be considered in the con-
text of other outcomes. Such measures have created enormous
harm—tens of millions of unemployed individuals, the inabil-
ity to obtain other types of health care, disruption of education,
and huge budgetary deficits everywhere, among others. An
ironic outcome of shutting down the economy is that almost
half of the decline in gross domestic product has occurred in
health care (Klein 2020). But, when confronted with decisions
framed as “Two million will die if we do not take action,
though some people will be unemployed for a short period of
time if we do take appropriate action,” the trade-offs involved
are incomplete and misleading.
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Expert opinion is important, but by definition, experts tend
to be focused on a limited number of phenomena. In addition,
they are frequently asked for opinions and recommendations in
contexts specific to their expertise and in the absence of infor-
mation about the broader context. While such opinions and
recommendations may rest, in part, on data or science, they
are only part science. They are also driven by assumptions and
bias. It is important to separate the data from the assumptions
and debate actions in the context of outcomes based on differ-
ent, and perhaps more likely, assumptions. The COVID-19
pandemic has made clear that science is never settled. Those
who argue about settled science do not understand science; all
science is tentative or, in the words of Merton (1973), orga-
nized skepticism.
For these reasons, it is important that any policy discussion
be carried out in a context in which assumptions are clearly
stated, the breadth of outcomes is articulated, and biases iden-
tified. Prospect theory is well demonstrated by the COVID-19
pandemic through the greater aversion to loss of life than the
prospect of cure. Extreme measures are justified to save lives,
but very high standards are set for the evaluation and use of a
potentially useful drug.
This is a place where marketers can be of help. Marketers
routinely examine decisions involving trade-offs and the influ-
ence of decision framing. The marketing field also has a deep
understanding of measurement and the ways in which measures
frame problems. The methods, tools, and theories that are
applied to determine the information content of the front of a
package or a television commercial can be applied to the study
and development of recommendations for policy makers. This
would have the advantage of moving the focus of marketing
from tactical decisions to greater policy and strategy decisions.
Some might argue that this is not marketing. This is a narrow
definition of marketing. Anything that affects consumer beha-
vior and market performance is within the domain of market-
ing, and marketing brings a unique perspective to the study of
these phenomena.
Uncertainty, Risk Management, and Public
Policy Response Are Multilayered
The COVID-19 pandemic has also made clear that policy is not
made at one level—it occurs at many levels ranging from the
individual organization, to local government, to state govern-
ment, to the federal government, to international agencies.
What is optimal at one level may not be optimal at another
level or another parallel body at the same level. To be helpful,
marketing scholars need to be specific about which policies and
policy makers, and at which level(s), their research informs.
The Role of Marketing
Although the COVID-19 pandemic began as a health problem,
the pandemic and responses to it quickly created marketing
issues. Sheltering in place, social distancing, and shutdown
of the economy have changed consumer behavior. The match-
ing of supply and demand, the heart of marketing as a disci-
pline, has emerged as a problem for products as diverse as toilet
paper and ventilators. The disadvantages of global supply
chains and just-in-time manufacturing, with inadequate buffer
stock, have become apparent. Marketing should address these
types of problems.
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